Purpose: This paper compares the efficiency of two revenue-sharing contracts and discusses the members' preference for a three-echelon supply chain with the retailer's different risk attitude.
(1) Two-echelon supply chain with revenue sharing contract A supply chain consists of several members that usually have different and conflicting objectives, which need to be coordinated by contracts. Many coordinating contracts, such as buy-back or return contract, revenue sharing contract, and quantity-flexibility contract, have been proposed to improve supply chain performance. A comprehensive review of contracts is presented in Govindan, Popiuc and Diabat (2013) . Among the different kinds of contracts, revenue sharing contract is a popular contract which proved to be efficient for several industries. For example, revenue sharing contract increased the video industry's total profit by an estimated 7% (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005) . Dana and Spier (2001) suggested the use of revenue sharing contract in a decentralized channel with a perfectly competitive downstream market and stochastic demand. They
show that a revenue sharing contract could induce the downstream firms to choose a channel-optimal action. Zhang and Chen (2014) studied information sharing in a make-to-stock supply chain under wholesale contract and revenue sharing contract.
They show that information sharing benefits the supplier, the retailer and the supply chain when revenue sharing contract is used. Hsueh (2014) proposed a new revenue sharing contract embedding corporate social responsibility to coordinate a two-tier supply chain.
(2) Multi-echelon supply chains with revenue sharing contract
In reality, supply chain consists of more than two echelons. So the research on the multi-echelon supply chain is a need. Some researchers focus on the coordination of multi-echelon supply chains, such as Jaber, Bonney and Guiffrida (2010) . The research has been conducted on the coordination of multi-echelon supply chains with contracts such as price-only contract, quantity discount contract, buyback contract, and revenue sharing contract.
We notice that two revenue sharing contracts can be used in multi-echelon supply chain. The first one is that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities,
proposed by Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) , and is extended to study a three-echelon supply chain with surplus goods and credit losing by Ji, Liu and Han (2007) . Then, it is expanded to study a three-echelon supply chain with the retailer's sales effort by Pang, Chen and Hu (2014) . Moreover, the second one is that the retailer simultaneously shares her revenues with all supply chain members, proposed by Rhee et al. (2010) , and is extended to study an N-stage supply chain with reliability considerations by Feng, Moon and Ryu (2014) . Rhee et al. (2010) pointed out that the contract of Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) has a key difficulty to implement, i.e., the contract implicitly assumes that all contracts between the pairs of entities are installed simultaneously. Jiang, Wang, Yan and Dai (2014) showed that the contract of Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) may never be established in a three-echelon supply chain with competing manufacturers, where the members in the supply chain make decision sequentially. However, with the high-speed developing of internet, it is easily implemented that all contracts between the pairs of entities are installed simultaneously in a three-echelon supply chain. Jiang et al. (2014) focused on a three-echelon supply chain with the two revenue sharing contracts. But they don't analyze the member's risk attitude in the supply chain.
(3) Supply chain coordination with risk-averse member
Modeling risk-averse newsvendor problem has received considerable attention in recent years. Utility functions, mean-variance approach, value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) are four main research streams. We focus on the VaR approach, which is a financial risk measure that has emerged and been widely used in recent years. A distinct disadvantage of the standard VaR criterion is that it purely considers risk but not the expected profits. Although many supply chain members may be risk-averse, they still seek to attain a high (expected) profit. To reflect this, VaR can be used as a constraint, e.g., with a probability of 95% the realized profit is at least some fixed amount (Gan et al., 2005) .
Gan, Sethi, and Yan (2004) first consider a supply chain coordination problem with risk-averse agent. According to Gan et al. (2004) , we know that
'A contract coordinates a supply chain if under the contract, (1) the agents' reservation payoff constraints are satisfied, and (2) the agents' joint action under this contract is Pareto-optimal.'
In a companion paper (Gan et al., 2005) , the definition of coordination was specialized for a supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a downside-risk constrained newsvendor.
To coordinate a supply chain with risk-averse members, some well-known contracts have been considered such as return policy, profit sharing contract, the target sales rebate contract and real option contract. Moreover, some new contracts have proposed to improve supply chain performance and achieve supply chain coordination, such as gain/loss sharing contract, advanced-purchase discount contract, buyback-setup-cost-sharing mechanism and risk sharing contract. In multi-echelon supply chain, Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) introduced risk-neutral intermediaries to offer mutually beneficial contracts to risk-averse retailers, and they demonstrated that an important role of an intermediary in distribution channels is to reduce the risk faced by retailers; Xu, Meng 
Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain with a Risk-neutral Retailer
In this section, we focus on a one-period supply chain model, which has a manufacturer (M), a distributor (D) and a retailer (R). The material, information, and financial flow are specified as plotting in Figure 1 . There is just one kind of product selling in one-period. The lead-times of the order from both the retailer and the distributor are zero. Each member has an infinite capacity.
The demand in one period, denoted by X, is stochastic random with the distribution function F(·) and the density function f(·). The unsatisfied demand in the end of the period is lost. In the supply chain, the following events will happen sequentially in one selling period: (1) at the beginning of the selling period, the manufacturer produces the product at the cost cM per unit and the manufacturer announces the wholesale price w2 per unit; (2) after observing the wholesale price from the manufacture, the distributor announces the wholesale price, denoted by w1 per unit; (3) the retailer makes order from the distributor and the order quantity is Q; (4) the distributor makes the same order as the retailer from the manufacturer and delivers products to the retailer immediately, her transferring cost for per unit of product is c D; (5) the retailer has hold cost cR per unit for the arrived products. Economically, any supply chain member's pricing is greater than her cost. So three inequalities hold such as w1 + cR < p, cD + w2 < w1 and cM < w2.
In fact, there are only two revenue sharing contracts in the three-echelon supply chain. The revenue sharing contract I, introduced in Section 3.1, was proposed by Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) to coordinate a three-echelon supply chain. Moreover, the monitoring and controlling quality of the multi-echelon supply chain is very important such as food multi-echelon supply chain. The revenue sharing contract II, introduced in Section 3.2, is a good contract to monitor and control quality in the multi-echelon supply chain.
The Revenue Sharing Contract I with a Risk-neutral Retailer
The revenue sharing contract I (denoted by superscript I) in the three-echelon supply chain is shown in Figure 2 . At the end of selling period, the retailer gives of her revenue to the distributor and the distributor gives of her revenue to the manufacturer , where and represent the members' bargaining power in the supply chain. If the manufacturer's bargaining power is stronger, is large; if the distributor's bargaining power is stronger, is large and is small; and if the retailer's bargaining power is stronger, is small.
In the supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I, the expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer are as follows:
and (3) The total expected profit of the supply chain is the sum of all the supply chain members' profit, i.e., Figure 2 . The three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I
In the centralized supply chain, the total expected profit of the supply chain is concave with respect to Q. So the retailer has the unique positive and optimal order quantity Q C , i.e.,
Combining Equations (4) and (5), the optimal total expected profit of the supply chain is
According to Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) , for any given and , the revenue sharing contract I with parameters
coordinates the supply chain. With the coordinated revenue sharing contract I, the optimal profits of the three members are, respectively,
And (8c)
In the coordinated supply chain with revenue sharing contract I, the members' profit allocations are determined by and . Specifically, the retailer's profit share is , the distributor's profit share is and the manufacturer's profit share is . Thus, the revenue sharing contract I not only coordinates the three-echelon supply chain but also arbitrarily allocates the profit among the members. If the retailer's bargaining power becomes stronger, the retailer would expect the decreasing of ; if the distributor's bargaining power becomes stronger, the distributor would expect the increasing of and the decreasing of ;
and if the manufacturer's bargaining power becomes stronger, the manufacturer would expect the increasing of both and . It indicates that conflicts of interest exist among the three members.
Furthermore, the wholesale price is negative if and is negative if . Therefore, if the manufacturer (the distributor) has a strong bargaining power, the manufacturer (the distributor) may set a negative wholesale price to the distributor (the retailer). This can be regarded as a principle-agent chain that the manufacturer (the distributor) entrusts the distributor (the retailer) to sell products through spending a certain cost. And the manufacturer (the distributor) gets a higher rebate from the distributor (the retailer) at the end of the selling period. Such a situation occurs in a commercial practice, i.e. a regular chain.
The Revenue Sharing Contract II with a Risk-neutral Retailer
The revenue sharing contract II (denoted by superscript II) in the three-echelon supply chain is shown in Figure 3 . At the end of selling period, the retailer gives of her revenue to the distributor, and gives of her revenue to the manufacturer, where . In the revenue sharing contract II, and represent the members' bargaining power in the supply chain. If the manufacturer's bargaining power is stronger, is large; if the distributor's bargaining power is stronger, is large; and if the retailer's bargaining power is stronger, both and are small. In the supply chain with the revenue sharing contract II, the expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer are as follows:
Compare the Coordinated Results between the Two Revenue Sharing Contracts
According to the above subsections, both of the revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the three-echelon supply chain with coordinated parameters. However, the supply chain members' optimal profits are changed in the different revenue sharing contracts. For the supply chain, the problem is which contract will be preferred. We will focus on this problem in this subsection.
For the supply chain, the revenue sharing contract I and the revenue sharing contract II are the same because both of them can maximize the total supply chain profit. For each member of the supply chain, we compare their optimal profit in the revenue sharing contract I with that in the revenue sharing contract II, respectively. The comparative results are given in Table 1 .
In Table 1 
Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain with a Risk-averse Retailer
In some supply chains with smaller retailer, both the manufacturer and the distributor can transfer their risk downside and the smaller retailer prefers to risk-averse. In this kind of case can the revenue sharing contracts still coordinate the three-echelon supply chain? Based on the question, the performance of the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer is focused on the rest of the paper. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the supply chain performances with different revenue sharing contract is conducted.
The downside risk measure is the probability that the return is below a target level. Its pioneering definition was introduced by Fishburn (1977) and was reset by Gan et al. (2005) in a newsvendor model. According to Gan et al. (2005) , letting αR be the target profit of the risk-averse retailer, for any given order quantity Q and random demand realized value X, the retailer's downside risk is the probability that her profit is not greater than αR, i.e., P{πR(Q, X)≤ αR)}. Hence for any given target profit level αR and upper bound of the downside risk βR(0<βR<1), the risk-averse retailer makes an order quantity Q j* (j=I or II) to maximize her expected profit, while her profit doesn't fall below her target profit level αR and the downside risk doesn't exceed a specified βR(0<βR<1). The downside-risk-averse retailer's decision problem is
The retailer's extent of risk-aversion is measured by risk-aversion pair (αR,βR). For two risk-aversion pairs and , if and , then the second pair means a higher aversion to risk than does the first. Hence, the pair (αR,βR) can be called the retailer's risk-averse level.
The Revenue Sharing Contract I with a Risk-averse Retailer
In the three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract I, the risk-averse retailer's optimal order quantity and the retailer's downside risk are discussed, which the wholesale prices and in the revenue sharing contract I are given by Equations (7a) and (7b). With the upper and lower bound in hands, the retailer's optimal order quantity Q I* is given by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), the retailer's optimal order quantity is (17) where .
The Proposition With the upper and lower bound in hands, we can derive the retailer's optimal order quantity.
Proposition 6. For any given risk-aversion level (αR,βR), the retailer's optimal order quantity is given by (21) where . 
and (22c) respectively. Furthermore, , , and ;
)≥βR, all the members' optimal expected profits are zero.
According to Proposition 7, the retailer's profit share is , the distributor's profit share is and the manufacturer's profit share is . So even if the retailer's risk attitude has changed, the members' profit shares are no change in the supply chain with the revenue
, any member's optimal expected profit in the supply chain with the risk-averse retailer is less than that in the supply chain with the risk-neutral retailer, and the retailer's optimal decision cannot maximize the total expected profit of the supply chain by executing the revenue sharing contract II.
Compare the Supply Chain Performance between the Two Revenue Sharing

Contracts
We analyze the differences between the two revenue sharing contracts on the performance of the supply chain. The comparative analysis is discussed in three aspects, the retailers' downside-risk, the retailer's optimal order quantity and the members' expected profits. Lemma 3 can be obtained by observing Equations (15) and (19), so we omit the proof. 
Comparative Analysis on the
Comparative Analysis on the Retailer's Optimal Order
Equations (17) and (21) According to Proposition 9, the retailer's optimal order quantity is confined by her risk aversion level (αR,βR) as well as the contract parameters , and in the supply chain. Therefore, if the retailer's profit share is the same (Proposition 9(1)), the supply chain gets the same profit in the two contracts. Besides that, with different revenue sharing contracts, the total profit of the supply chain is different. We have the corollaries as follows. ).
According to Corollaries 1-3, for the whole supply chain, the efficiency of the two revenue sharing contracts is different, which is related to the retailer's profit share and the upper bound of the retailer's downside risk.
Comparative Analysis on the Members' Expected Profits
Similar to the analyses on the retailer's order quantity, we discuss the members' expected profits in the two revenue sharing contracts.
Proposition 10. For the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer, comparative results of their optimal expected profit under the two revenue sharing contracts are shown in Table 2,   Table 3 and Table 4 , respectively.
According to Proposition 10, we get three corollaries as follows. According to corollaries 4-6, for all the supply chain members, the efficiency of the two revenue sharing contracts is also different, which is related to each member's profit share, the retailer's target profit level, and the upper bound of the retailer's downside risk. 
Constraint conditions Comparative results
F(Q II0 )<βR<F(γ I ) F(γ I )≤βR F(Q I0 )<βR<F(γ II ) F(γ II )≤βRβR≤F(Q I0 ) F(Q I0 )<βR<F(γ I ) F(γ I )≤βR F(Q II0 )<βR≤F(Q I0 ) F(Q I0 )<βR<F(γ I ) Uncertainty F(γ I )≤βR F(Q I0 )<βR≤F(Q II0 ) F(Q II0 )<βR<F(γ II ) Uncertainty F(γ II )≤βR
The Improved Contracts of the Two Revenue Sharing Contracts in the Supply Chain with a Risk-averse Retailer
According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, both the two revenue sharing contracts are not necessarily able to coordinate the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer. Hence, in this section, we will improve the two revenue sharing contracts to coordinate the supply chain and continue to compare the two contracts.
In the three-echelon supply chain with the revenue sharing contract j(j=I, II), the retailer's downside risk and her expected profit increase with the order quantity Q when Q According to the above description, the risk sharing contract j(j=I, II) is modified to make downside protection for the retailer and coordinate the supply chain. Here, the risk sharing contract j is an improved contract of the revenue sharing contract j, so the revenue sharing contract j is called the initial contract of the risk sharing contract j.
The risk sharing contract j is defined as follows and its basic structure is given in Figure 6: (i) If the retailer's order quantity Q is less than or equal to Q j* , the initial contract is executed.
(ii) If the retailer's order quantity Q is greater than Q ).
To investigate the coordination of the three-echelon supply chain with the risk sharing contract, we adopt the definition of coordination proposed by Gan et al. (2005) .
Definition 1. (Gan et al., 2005 ). The supply chain is coordinated if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) all the members get payoffs not less than their respective reservation payoffs, (2) the retailer's downside risk constraint is met, and (3) the supply chain's expected profit is maximized. Figure 6 . The basic structure of the risk sharing contract
In this paper the reservation payoff of member i is (i=R, D, M; j=I, II), which is the member i′s optimal expected profit in the supply chain with the risk-averse retailer under the revenue-sharing contract j.
The Risk Sharing Contract I with a Risk-averse Retailer
In the risk sharing contract I, the refund parameters, and , will be discussed first. If they satisfy and , the retailer and the distributor gain profit from the unsold products. This inspires the retailer to magnify the demand and results in a heavy bullwhip effect. Thus, it is reasonable that the refund parameters are limited to and , i.e.,
and (23b) respectively.
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and (26c) respectively.
Thus, we obtain a lower bound and an upper bound of in the following proposition. 
and (27c) respectively.
The Risk Sharing Contract II with a Risk-averse Retailer
Similar to the subsection 5.1, the refund parameters, and , will be discussed first. According to Equations (12a), (12b) and (30), the expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer are
and (31c) respectively.
Thus, we get a lower bound and an upper bound for in the following proposition. 
and (32c) respectively.
Compare the Coordinated Results between the Two Risk Sharing Contracts
For the whole supply chain, the two risk sharing contracts are equivalent if the risk-aversion Table 5 , where satisfies Equation (33) and (j=I or II).
According to Proposition 13, the comparison between the two revenue sharing contracts is very intuitive through executing the designed risk sharing contract. The conditions (1), (2), (3) in Table 5 are the conditions (4), (10) and (13) in Table 1 , respectively. Moreover, Table 5 is also a small part of Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 . Table 5 , the retailer's preference is the same between the two revenue sharing contracts.
But for the distributor and the manufacturer, their preferences between the two contracts are different. The distributor prefers the revenue sharing contract I (II) if her profit share in the revenue sharing contract I (II) is higher than that in the revenue sharing contract II (I).
Moreover, the manufacturer's preference is also positively related to her profit share in the supply chain. Therefore, we have a corollary as follows.
Corollary 7. Based on the risk sharing contracts and ,
(1) if , all the member gets the same profit between the two revenue sharing contracts; and (2) if , the retailer gets the same profit between the two revenue sharing contracts, and the distributor's preference between the two revenue sharing contracts are opposite to the manufacturer's.
Conclusion
We have analyzed two revenue sharing contracts for a three-echelon supply chain with the retailer's different risk attitude. Both the two revenue sharing contracts can coordinate this supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer. They are not always able to coordinate the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer. However, the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer can be coordinated by executing any risk sharing contracts, which are based on any kind of revenue sharing contracts.
After that, we have established the analytical relationships between the two revenue sharing retailer is risk-averse and the risk sharing contract is executed, for the whole supply chain and the retailer, the efficiencies of the two revenue sharing contracts are the same; for the distributor and the manufacturer, the efficiencies of the two revenue sharing contracts are different, except when , the distributor's preference between the two revenue sharing contracts are opposite to and the manufacturer's.
In practice, which kind of revenue sharing contract is employed in the supply chain, depends on the indicator of the supply chain decision-maker concerned, such as the profit of supply chain, the profit of each member, the risk of the retailer faced. From the different perspective, the comparative results between the two revenue sharing contracts are different. If the decisionmaker concerns total profit of the supply chain, any revenue-sharing contract can be used. If the decision-maker is a member in the supply chain, she would like to execute a revenue-sharing contract which gives her a higher profit, and this may be hurting the other members' benefits.
Specially, if the retailer is risk-averse, the decision-maker should consider the risk of the retailer faced expect the profit in the supply chain. So the best way is executing the risk-sharing contract both to coordinate the supply chain and to satisfy the retailer's risk constraint. Moreover, it is also beneficial to the decision-maker that the comparative results of the two revenue sharing contracts under the risk-sharing contract are intuitive (See Corollary 7).
In a nutshell, this study provides an accurate and comprehensive guide for the supply chain ). In this case, the retailer's optimal order quantity cannot maximize the supply chain profit and the supply chain cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I.
If βR≤F(Q I0 ), the retailer would not order any product. Hence, the supply chain also cannot be coordinated by the revenue sharing contract I in this case.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the supply chain governed by the revenue sharing contract I with and , we discuss the members' expected profit from three cases as follows:
( 1) (1-3), (7a) and (7b), the optimal profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer are also Equations (8a), (8b) and (8c) (1), (2), (3), (7a) and (7b), the optimal expected profits of the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer become Equations (18a), (18b) and (18c) This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the three-echelon supply chain governed by the revenue sharing contract II with and , we discuss the members' expected profit from three cases. ), according to Proposition 6, the retailer does not order a quantity. So all the member's expected profits are zero.
Proof of Proposition 8
(1) According to Equations (16) and (20) (2) According to Lemma 3 and Equations (15), (16), (19) and (20) This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, if , noting Equations (17) and (21) ). Therefore, the retailer would order Q C which maximizes her expected profit subject to her downside-risk constraint.
Thus the supply chain's profit is maximized.
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This completes the proof. ). Therefore, the retailer would order Q C which maximizes her expected profit subject to her downside-risk constraint.
Proof of Proposition
Thus, the supply chain's profit is maximized.
According to Definition 1, the supply chain is coordinated.
Proof of Proposition 13. Under the condition of and , we have holds. According to Equations (27a) and (32a), if , the retailer has the same
